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ABSTRAK
Tujuan kajian ini adalah untuk menguji sama ada lembaga pengarah bebas memberi kesan
ke atas laporan audit tidak baik bagi syarikat-syarikat bukan perbankan dan kewangan yang
berdaftar di Bursa Malaysia. Data dikumpulkan daripada laporan tahunan syarikat-syarikat
sebanyak 300 sampel bagi tempoh 2004 sehingga 2009. Kedua-dua analisa descriptive dan
multivariate digunakan untuk mencapai objektf-objektif kajian. Hasilnya menunjukan
lembaga pengarah bebas memberi kesan terhadap penerimaan laporan audit tidak baik.
Seterusnya, kadar hutang syarikat yang tinggi akan meningkatkan penerimaan laporan audit
tidak baik sementara bagi syarikat yang mempunyai banyak cabang perniagaan, penerimaan
laporan audit tidak baik berkurang. Walaubagaimanapun, saiz lembaga pengarah dan
keuntungan ke atas asset tidak mempengaruhi pengeluaran laporan audit tidak baik oleh
juruaudit. Hasil kajian menyediakan bukti ilmiah ke atas perkembangan dan kepentingan
lembaga pengarah bebas dan kaitannya kepada laporan audit tidak baik.
Kata kunci: Lembaga pengarah bebas; laporan audit tidak baik; Malaysia
ABSTRACT
The aim of the paper is to examine whether board of directors’ (BODs) independence has an
effect on the modified audit report of the non-banking and financial companies listed on
Bursa Malaysia. Data is collected from the annual reports of a sample of 300 companies for
the period of 2004 to 2009. Both descriptive and multivariate analyses were employed to
address the research objectives. The results indicate that BODs’ independence is negatively
related to acceptance of modified audit report. In addition, a company’s higher debts or
leverage may probably increase the acceptance of modified audit report; while for companies
with more business segments, the acceptance of modified audit report is less. However, the
size of the BODs and return on assets or asset profitability do not influence the issuance of
modified audit report by the auditor. The findings provide empirical evidence on the
development and importance of BODs’ independence relating to modified audit report.
Keywords: Board of directors’ independence; modified audit report; Malaysia
INTRODUCTION
The independence of board of directors (BODs) is increasingly becoming an issue in the
corporate environment world. The composition of BODs is very important to ensure it has
full power without any outside influences, including from management and other board
members. The objective of this study is to examine whether the independence of BODs
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affects the modified audit report issued by the auditor. The researchers are interested to relate
BODs’ independence and modified audit report as this type of report is a symptom of lower
reporting quality (Farinha & Viana 2009). The Asian financial crisis (1997-1998) has shown
the ineffectiveness of the role of independent directors in monitoring the companies’
activities as expected by the shareholders (Sahlan 2011). In the United Kingdom (UK),
Section B of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) stipulates that the board
combination should include executive and independent non-executive members to avoid
domination of certain members of the board in decision making. In Malaysia, Principle 3 of
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) (2007) and (2012) requires the board
to undertake an annual assessment of independent directors to ensure they truly bring
independent and objective judgment to board deliberations. When a board is really
independent, theoretically, the oversight function executed is more effective and reduces the
possibility of opportunistic managerial behavior. Such directors act in the best interests of
shareholders, without pressure and influence from management and others. The operational
effectiveness and external issues, such as going-concern, are addressed by independent BODs
and the probability of the companies receiving modified audit reports is less.
This study contributes to the knowledge that the BODs’ independence impacts the
acceptance of modified audit report by a company. The independent non-executive directors
tend to be more concerned with their reputation and always seek for higher quality than
executive directors (Fama 1980; Subramaniam, McManus & Zhang 2009). They avoid
negative occurrences which can lead to the acceptance of modified audit report, which in turn
can have a negative impact on their reputation. Besides, independent non-executive directors
actively question management’s decisions as they have no social and economic ties with
management (Liew, Mat Zain & Jaffar 2012). Under the agency theory, the independent non-
executive directors are the guardians of company and shareholders’ interests. Independent
non-executive directors will ensure that any decision made by the management is in the best
interests of the shareholders. Consequently, the acceptance of modified report which results
from accounting wrong-doings, non-compliance of guidelines and going-concern issues is
reduced and integrity of financial statements is enhanced.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the past literature and
hypotheses development. The third section provides the research methodology, followed by
the fourth section on analysis of results and discussion. Last section presents the conclusion
and recommendations.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Studies on the relationship between BODs’ independence and modified audit report in the
Malaysian environment are still scarce and limited. However, there are some studies related
to BODs’ characteristics and modified audit report or with regards to quality of financial
reporting, such as by Farinha and Viana (2009); Sahlan (2011); and Wenyao and Qin (2007).
The study on the effectiveness of BODs is important as it represents the highest corporate
governance structure in a company (Fama & Jensen 1983). In addition, an independent board
is in itself a cornerstone of good corporate governance (Saibaba 2013). Independent and non-
executive directors bring in a diversity of skills and expertise. They are also seen as the
check-and-balance of the BODs’ effectiveness (Abdullah 2004). For the quality of
monitoring, Pincus, Rusbarsky and Wong (1989) argued that BODs’ independence should
increase the quality of monitoring as the directors are not influenced by the management
and/or affiliated with the company’s employees. Other studies also support this argument,
i.e., a higher proportion of independent non-executive directors will lower earnings
management (Klein 2002; Peasnell, Pope & Young 2005; Sahlan 2011); and reduce the
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probability of accounting fraud (Beasley 1996). Chen and Jaggi (2000) added that a board
with more independent members will increase financial disclosure quality. Further, Uzun,
Szewczyk and Varma (2004), in their study, reported that the higher the percentage of
independent directors on the board, the lesser the occurrences of corporate wrong-doings as
well as discretionary accruals (Xie, Davidson III & DaDalt 2003). The existence of
independent directors on the board can bring about independent and objective judgement,
hence mitigating risks that arise from conflict of interests or undue influence from interested
parties.
From the economic perspective, a company is likely to add more independent board
members when the company’s assets have a shorter life span and the management’s
incentives or agency cost is greater (Kanatas & Qi 2012). Independent directors on a board
can reduce the agency cost. An earlier study by Denis and Sarin (1997) found that companies
with a higher proportion of independent directors on the board experience above-average
stock price returns.
In terms of internal control, Kamardin and Haron (2011) argued that independent non-
executive directors who are on the audit committee and have communication with external
and internal auditors, play an important role in ensuring the effectiveness of the internal
control system. Sahlan (2011), in his study, concluded that the presence of independent
directors on the board will improve the company’s financial reporting and financial
disclosure. This argument is supported by the findings of an earlier study by Farinha and
Viana (2009) that a higher proportion of outside directors on the board may probably reduce
the acceptance of modified audit report. Wenyao and Qin (2007) also found a similar result
that there is a lower proportion of independent or outside directors on the boards of
companies that receive modified audit report. Thus, the following hypothesis is generated.
H1 The higher proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board is negatively
associated with the probability that the company will receive modified audit report.
The researchers also include some other factors that may contribute to the acceptance of
modified audit report by a company as follows: BODs size (BODSIZE); leverage (LEV);
asset profitability (ASSPRO); and business segment (BUSSEG).
Jensen (1983) argued that increasing  size of the board will increase the monitoring
capacity of the board, thus resulting in higher quality of financial reporting. This is because
of the synergy of skills and experiences possessed by the various directors (Farinha & Viana
2009). Further, Singh and Harianto (1989) argued that it is difficult for management to
influence all the directors if the size of the board is large. Saibaba (2013) also found that
larger board size increases the company’s financial performance in terms of market share
value. However, in a different perspective, a larger board size can be related to reduced
ability to coordinate, monitor and communicate among the directors, thus leading to
ineffective functioning, as well as poorer financial reporting quality (Ballesta & Garcia-Meca
2005). This argument is consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976), and was also argued by
the agency theory, that a smaller board is more effective in monitoring managers. Abdul
Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006), in their study, found a small board is more effective in
managing earnings management activities. For firm performance, Singh and Davidson
(2003); and Mak and Li (2001) also found that a small board is likely to increase the
performance of firms. There are therefore many different views on BODs size. For example,
Farinha and Viana (2009); and Wenyao and Qin (2007), in their study, found an insignificant
relationship between BODs size and acceptance of modified audit report. A smaller board
size is seen to be better for oversight responsibility, monitoring financial reporting and related
internal control (Farinha & Viana 2009). Even if more members sit on the board, its
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effectiveness may be questionable because they may rely on other members to perform their
tasks. Even if the size of the Risk Management Committee (RMC) is big, if there is
inadequate qualified members, the effectiveness of the RMC is still questionable. Therefore,
in this study, the researchers expect a positive association between BOD size (BODSIZE) and
modified audit report.
Leverage refers to the total debt of a company to the total assets owned. It determines the
ability of the company to meet its financial obligations. According to the agency theory, there
is a conflict between principal (shareholders) and agent (manager) in a company (Jensen &
Meckling 1976). The same situation occurs in leverage, where there is a conflict between
debt-holders and management (DeFond 1992; Francis & Wilson 1988). High financial
obligations has a negative effect on the company (Pucheta-Martinez & Feuntes 2007). The
financial health of a company is also a contributing factor as to why auditors issue qualified
or modified audit report (Chen & Church 1992; Carcello, Hermanson & Huss 1995;
Willikens, Bauwhede & Gaeremynch 2004). Therefore, the expected sign between high
leverage (LEV) and modified audit report is positive.
Larger asset profitability would lead to a lower probability of a company being issued a
modified audit report by the auditor (Farinha & Viana 2009). However, Masyitoh and
Adhariani (2010) found an insignificant relationship between profitability and qualified audit
report. This means profitability has no effect on the decision made by the auditor to issue
qualified or modified audit report. Meanwhile, Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2001)
found a negative relationship between performance and the receipt of modified audit opinion.
The argument leads to a negative relationship between asset profitability (ASSPRO) and
modified audit report.
Normally, if a company has two or more business segments, it tends to set up a Risk
Management Committee (RMC) for better oversight function at board level, particularly on
company’s risk profile. The operation of different types of businesses needs effective
monitoring by the BODs, thus the establishment of a RMC is a best practice to address the
issue of risks faced by the company, particularly the business and external environmental
risks (Yatim 2009, 2010; Subramaniam et al. 2009). Therefore, companies with two or more
business segments (BUSSEG) are expected to have a negative relationship with the issuance
of modified audit report by the auditor.
VARIABLES
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
CONTROL VARIABLES
 BODs’ Independence
 BODs Size
Modified Audit Opinion
 Leverage
 Asset Profitability
 Business Segment
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FIGURE 1. Theoretical framework for BODs' Independence, BODs Size and Modified Audit
Opinion
Figure 1 above presents the theoretical framework for this study: BODs’ Independence
and BOD Size are the independent variables; Leverage, Asset Profitability and Business
Segment represent the control variables; while Modified Audit Opinion is the dependent
variable in the framework.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
We use the logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship between modified audit
report and the variables proposed for BODs’ independence. The model used to test the
hypotheses is as follows:
MA= β0 + β1 BODINDE + β2 BODSIZE + β3 LEV + β4 ASSPRO + β5 BUSSEG + ε
where :-
MA -Modified Audit Report
1, if received modified audit, otherwise 0
BODINDE -BODs’ Independence
proportion of independent non-executive members on the board
BODSIZE -BODs Size
number of board members
LEV -Leverage
total debt/total assets
ASSPRO -Asset Profitability
ratio between earning before interest, tax and extraordinary income and total
assets
BUSSEG - Business Segment
1, if the company has two or more business segments, otherwise 0
Variable Definition and Measurement According to Arens et al. (2009), there are five
types of audit reports, namely standard unqualified or clean audit report; unqualified with
explanatory paragraph or modified wording; qualified; adverse; and disclaimer audit report.
For the purpose of this study, the unqualified with explanatory paragraph (modified
wording); qualified (except for); adverse; and disclaimer audit reports are classified as
modified audit reports. As highlighted by Masyitoh and Adhariani (2010), the auditor’s
opinion relevant to qualified or going concern is a red alert that the company is facing
financial failure. Farinha and Viana (2009), in their study, viewed the issuance of modified
audit opinion by an auditor as a symptom of lower reporting quality. If a company received a
modified audit report, the data is valued as ‘1’ in the worksheet; and if a company received an
audit report other than modified audit report, the value of ‘0’ is coded accordingly.
BODs’ independence refers to the number of independent non-executive members on the
board. The number of independent non-executive members is divided by the total number of
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members, and a proportionate number is generated (see Fama & Jensen 1983; Farinha &
Viana 2009; Pucheta-Martinez & Fuentes 2007). As for BODs size, the researchers count the
total number of directors during the company’s financial year.
Leverage in this study refers to the total debt of a company to the total assets owned. It is
measured by the total debts divided by the total assets. For this type of variable, the
researchers divided the total debts by the total assets. The result was entered into the
worksheet. There are other studies which have applied this rule for the variable’s
measurement (see Pucheta-Martinez & Fuentes 2007; Ballesta & Garcia-Meca 2005; Yatim
2010).
The researchers also included the variable of asset profitability in this study. Asset
profitability refers to the ratio between earnings before interest, tax and extraordinary income
(operational profit or loss) to the total assets. The data for the earnings before interest, tax and
extraordinary income was obtained from the income statement and the total assets from the
balance sheet statement. After the calculation of this ratio, the result was entered into the
worksheet. Farinha and Viana (2009) also applied this measurement in their study.
Lastly, for the business segment variable, the researchers calculated the number of types
of businesses or segments a company owns and operates. Normally, if a company has two or
more business segments, it tends to set up a RMC for better oversight function at board level.
The data is obtained from the company’s annual report which normally is available in the
initial pages of the report. If the company has two or more business segments, a dummy value
of ‘1’ is coded and if the company is operating just one business segment, the value of ‘0’is
coded accordingly.
Data Collection and Sampling Procedure The population frame for this study is all the
public-listed companies (PLCs), excluding banking and financial institutions listed on Bursa
Malaysia’s website from the period of financial years ended 2004 until 2009. Banking and
financial institutions are omitted from the sample as the nature and regulations of these firms
are significantly different from non-financial companies. PLCs publish their annual reports,
which are publicly available and can be accessed through Bursa Malaysia’s website.
A match sampling approach is adopted as a control procedure (see Ballesta & Garcia-
Meca 2005; Wenyao & Qin 2007; Sekaran 2003). Firstly, the researchers selected the
companies with modified audit report for the period of study (2004-2009). Then, they
matched the control samples which have a clean audit report based on the condition that
paired companies are in the same industry, almost similar in  size (total assets) and in the
same financial year (Ballesta & Garcia-Meca 2005; Wenyao & Qin 2007). To ensure
reliability and independence, once a control company has been matched to the corresponding
company in the test sample in a particular year, it was not matched again with another
company (test sample) in another year (Ballesta & Garcia-Meca 2005). Lastly, in this study,
150 samples with modified audit opinion were gathered and matched with 150 samples with
clean audit opinion. Therefore, the total number of samples in this study is 300 samples.
ANALYSIS OF RESULT AND DISCUSSION
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SAMPLES
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics result for all of the companies, modified audit report
companies and clean audit report companies (continuous variables), together with the result
of t-test. For BODs’ Independence (BODINDE) variable, the result shows some differences
between modified and clean audit report companies. For minimum value, modified audit
report companies obtained 25 percent; while clean audit report companies obtained only 20
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percent. For maximum value, clean audit report companies scored 100 percent of board
members are independent non-executive directors; while only 80 percent of modified audit
report companies have independent non-executive members. For mean or average value,
three groups of samples (all, modified and clean audit report companies) indicate almost
similar value with five members being independent non-executive members. The result of
independent t-test shows this variable is statistically significant at a level of p < 0.05, with
indication that there is a significant difference on average for this variable between two
different sets of samples (modified and clean audit report companies).
TABLE 1. Result of the descriptive statistics for all (N=300), modified (N=150) and clean
audit report companies (N=150) (Continuous Variables)
All
Companies Modified Audit Opinion Co Clean Audit Opinion Co t-test
Sig
(2-
tailed)
Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std t value
Deviation Deviation Deviation
BODINDE 0.20 1.00 0.4746 0.11485 0.25 0.80 0.4604 0.11324 0.20 1.00 0.4888 0.11506 -2.162 0.031
BODSIZE 3.00 10.00 6.7800 1.54474 4.00 10.00 6.9067 1.49427 3.00 10.00 6.6533 0.19746 1.423 0.156
LEV 0.00 55.74 0.6718 3.89812 0.00 55.74 1.1830 5.47188 0.00 0.72 0.1606 0.15830 2.287 0.024
ASSPRO -20.65 11.08 -.1689 1.50203 -20.65 11.08 -.3526 2.10298 -1.41 0.43 0.0148 0.19204 -2.130 0.035
Variable Definition: BODINDE = proportion of independent non-executive members on board
BODSIZE = number of directors
LEV = total debt/total assets
ASSPRO = ratio between earnings before interest, tax and extraordinary income and total asset s
For BODs Size (BODSIZE), the maximum value of 10 members of the board is stated
for modified and clean audit report companies. As for minimum value, modified audit report
companies show four members and three members for clean audit report companies. All the
sample groups state seven board members on average or mean value. The result also reports
that there is a significant difference for mean value between modified and clean audit report
companies at 10 percent level (2-tailed).
The result of descriptive analysis shows drastic differences for maximum value for the
Leverage (LEV) variable between modified and clean audit report companies. For modified
audit report companies, the result shows that the debts of this group are more than 500
percent compared to total assets. As for clean audit report companies, they have only 72
percent of debts compared to the company’s total assets. The difference is expected earlier by
the researchers in that the higher amount of leverage contributes to the higher acceptance of
modified audit report. For the result of t-test, there is a statistical difference for average or
mean value between modified and clean audit report companies at five percent significance
level.
For Asset Profitability (ASSPRO) variable, there are different results between modified
and clean audit report samples of companies. The result of t-test also reports significant
difference at p < 0.05 which indicates that there is a significant difference for mean or
average value between modified and clean audit report companies. In terms of minimum
value, the result shows that more than 200 percent losses compared to total assets for
modified audit report samples; while for clean audit report samples, only 14 percent losses
compared to the company’s total assets.
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Table 1.1. Result of the Frequency Distribution for All (N=300), Modified (N=150) and Clean Audit
Opinion Companies (N=150) (Categorical/Dichotomous Variables)
All Companies Modified Audit  Opinion Co Clean Audit Opinion Co
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
MA
Clean Audit Opinion 150 50 0 0 150 100
Modified Audit Opinion 150 50 150 100 0 0
Total 300 100 150 100 150 100
BUSSEG
Non-Business Segment 6 2 5 3.3 1 0.7
Two or More Bus Segments 294 98 145 96.7 149 99.3
Total 300 100 150 100 150 100
Variable Definition: MA = 1, if received modified audit, otherwise 0
BUSSEG = 1, if the company has two or more business segments, otherwise 0
Table 1.1 presents the descriptive statistics (frequency) result for all the companies,
modified audit report companies and clean audit report companies (categorical/dichotomous
variables). For the Business Segment (BUSSEG) variable, most companies or samples have
two or more business segments with above 96 percent for both samples (modified and clean
audit opinion companies).
CORRELATION ANALYSIS (PEARSON CORRELATION MATRIX) FOR VARIABLES
TABLE 2. Result of correlation (Pearson Correlation Matrix)
**. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Modified
Audit
Report
BODs’
Independence
BODs
Size Leverage
Asset
Profitability
Business
Segment
Modified Audit
Report 1 -.124* .082 .131* -.122* -.095
BODs’
Independence 1 -.250** -.011 .089 -.123*
BODs Size 1 .045 -.094 .010
Leverage 1 -.485** .014
Asset Profitability 1 -.011
Business Segment 1
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Table 2 reports the result of correlation among the variables. The correlations are quite low,
generally below 0.2 except for a pair of BODs’ Independence and BOD Size, which are
correlated at 25 percent with 0.01 level of significance with negative direction. It means that
the bigger the size of the board, the lower its independence. It also indicates that even if the
size of the board increases, the status of the board with independent non-executive directors
still remains and does not increase. The highest correlation is between a pair of Asset
Profitability and Leverage which are correlated at 48 percent at one percent level of
significance and with negative direction. It shows that the higher the debts or leverage of the
companies, the lower the asset profitability. The other variables that correlate are Modified
Audit Report and BODs’ Independence at 12 percent (p < 0.05); Modified Audit Report and
Leverage at 13 percent (p < 0.05); Modified Audit Report and Asset Profitability at 12
percent (p < 0.05); and a pair of BODs’ Independence and Business Segment at 12 percent (p
< 0.05) significance levels. The rest of the variables do not correlate with each other. The
result also reveals that there is no correlation higher than 85 percent, which means no
multicollinearity problem exists in the samples.
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Table 3 reports the logistic regression result. The model consists of independent variable
(BODs’ Independence) and control variables (BOD Size, Leverage, Asset Profitability and
Business Segment) with Modified Audit Report as dependent variable. The result reports the
level of correct classification (the percentage of correct predictions) at 78.7 percent; while
Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square report at 36 percent and 48 percent,
respectively. The Chi-square’s test reports at 133.954 and the model is significant at the 0.00
(p < 0.01) level.
For the BODs’ Independence (BODINDE), the result is statistically significant at level of
10 percent (SPSS reports 2-tailed) with negative sign. This result is consistent with the
findings by earlier studies, such as Farinha and Viana (2009); and Wenyao and Qin (2007),
that greater independence of BODs will reduce the acceptance of modified audit report. The
result also supports the argument by Kamardin and Haron (2011) that outside directors play
an important role in internal control system. A board which comprises independent and non-
executive members adheres more to the rules besides keeping the best interests of
shareholders; they are also free from the influence and pressures of management.
TABLE 3. Result of the logistic regressions
MA= β0 + β1 BODINDE + β2 BODSIZE + β3 LEV + β4 ASSPRO + β5 BUSSEG + ε
Variables Expected
Sign BODINDE + CV
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Independent
Variable
BODINDE
Control
Variables
BODSIZE
LEV
ASSPRO
BUSSEG
Constant
Chi-square(sig)
Cox & Snell R Square
Nagelkerke R Square
Classification
-
+
+
-
-
Coefficient Wald   test p-value
-2.232                   2.547                     .111
.079 .620                     .431
6.575 64.945                     .000
.179 1.081                     .298
-2.563                  3.994                     .046
1.102                    .441 .507
133.954 (.000)
.360
.480
78.7%
Variable Definition: BODINDE = proportion of independent non-executive members on the board
BODSIZE = number of board members
LEV = total debt/total assets
ASSPRO = ratio between earnings before interest, tax and extraordinary
income and total assets
BUSSEG = 1, if the company has two or more business segments, otherwise 0
For BOD Size (BODSIZE), the logistic regression analysis reports no statistically
significant result for this variable. BOD size does not influence the acceptance of modified
audit report by the companies. Small or big size boards have no relationship with modified
audit report. The result is inconsistent with the previous studies by Abdul Rahman and
Mohamed Ali (2006); Singh and Davidson (2003); and Mak and Li (2001); that board size
has influence on earnings management activities and firm performance.
The result also reports a statistically significant result for Leverage (LEV) at a level of 1
percent with positive direction as expected earlier by the researchers. This result is consistent
with a study done by Pucheta-Martinez and Feuntes (2007) that high financial obligation has
a negative effect on the company. The result is also supported by the arguments of Chen and
Church (1992); and Carcello et al. (1995) that financial health of a company contributes to
auditors issuing qualified or modified audit report. A high percentage of leverage or debts is a
signal of financial instability which will probably affect the future prospects of the company.
For the Asset Profitability (ASSPRO) variable, there is no statistically significant result,
indicating that asset profitability has no association or influence on the acceptance of
modified audit report. The result supports the finding of a study by Masyitoh and Adhariani
(2010) that asset profitability has no effect on acceptance of modified audit report. Lastly, the
logistic regression analysis reports a statistically significant result (p < 0.05) for the Business
Segment (BUSSEG) variable with negative sign as expected earlier. The result supports the
arguments by Yatim (2010); and Subramaniam et al. (2009) that the establishment of a RMC
to monitor the risk profile of the company can reduce the risks faced by the companies. The
companies with more business segments tend to set up a RMC specifically to monitor the risk
profile of the company. Hence, the probability of the companies facing greater risks is
reduced, hence reducing the acceptance of modified audit report, particularly on risk issues.
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
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The result from the statistical analysis has revealed some significant findings. Firstly, the
result documents that BODs’ independence influences the acceptance of modified audit
report. The finding contributes to the knowledge and literature on board members
composition. A higher number of independent non-executive members will probably reduce
the acceptance of modifed audit opinion which signifies their role to act in the best interests
of shareholders and investors. The statistical result shows that a company with higher
percentage of independent non-executives members on the board probably will reduce the
acceptance of modified audit report. This is aligned with arguments by scholars that
independent or outside directors always seek to maintain good reputation and act for the best
interests of shareholders, without pressure or influence from management. Effective
monitoring by independent non-executive BODs on internal operations as well as external
business environment will reduce negative occurrences, such as operational non-compliance
and going-concern issues that contribute to the issuance of modified audit report. The result
also supports the majority of corporate governance codes in many countries, such as the UK
Corporate Governance Code (2012); and the MCCG (2007) and (2012), that the composition
of the board should include independent members. Therefore, the regulators and policy
makers should ensure all the non-banking and financial companies listed on Bursa Malaysia
adhere to that code so as to have sufficient number of independent non-executive board
members.
The debts borne by the company also have a major effect on the acceptance of modified
audit report. The higher debts or leverage probably will increase the acceptance of modified
audit report. Higher debts are seen as financial instability to the company, especially with
regards to its future viability. High debt companies also face the risk of litigation by the
lenders if the company fails to make loan repayment. Auditors are aware of such situation
and issuing modified audit report is considered a viable step for the auditor. Companies with
more than one business segment are seen to have association with modified audit report.
Theoretically, the companies with more business segments or operations have to set up a
RMC to monitor the company’s businesses, particularly on risk issues. A RMC can reduce
exposure of the company to risks and issuance of modified audit report. Consequently, a
company with more business segments can probably reduce the acceptance of modified audit
report.
Lastly, size of BOD and asset profitability have no influence on the acceptance of
modified audit report. Small or big size boards is not a determinant of modified audit report
compareghfhgd to the number of independent non-executive members on the board. Asset
profitability is not a contributor to the acceptance of modified audit report. How much the
assets generate profit for the company is not a major factor leading to the issuance of
modified audit report by the auditors.
The study only consists of the non-banking and financial companies in Malaysia. Future
studies can include the banking and financial companies as well. This study uses secondary
data from companies’ annual reports. Future studies can use primary data, such as
information obtained via interviews with external auditors or questionnaires in order to gauge
their perceptions on the independent non-executive board members when they perform their
audit.
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